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INTRODUCTION 
For more than a decade, scholars and policymakers have 
debated the central notion of identifiability in privacy law.1  
De-identification, the process of removing personally identifia-
ble information from data collected that is stored and used by 
organizations, was once viewed as a silver bullet allowing or-
ganizations to reap data benefits while at the same time avoid-
ing risks and legal requirements.  However, the concept of de-
identification has come under intense pressure to the point of 
being discredited by some critics.2  Computer scientists and 
mathematicians have come up with a re-identification tit for 
every de-identification tat.3  At the same time, organizations 
around the world necessarily continue to rely on a wide range 
of technical, administrative and legal measures to reduce the 
identifiability of personal data to enable critical uses and val-
uable research while providing protection to individuals’ iden-
tity and privacy.4 
The debate around the contours of the term personally 
                                                          
 1.  For literature review see Ira S. Rubinstein & Woodrow Hartzog, Anony-
mization and Risk, 91 WASH. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2016). 
 2.  Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising 
Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010); but cf. Jane Yakowitz, 
Tragedy of the Data Commons, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH.1 (2011); also see Felix T. 
Wu, Defining Privacy and Utility in Data Sets, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1117 (2013). 
 3.  Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Robust De-anonymization of 
Large Sparse Datasets, 2008 PROC. 29TH IEEE SYMP. ON SECURITY & PRIVACY 
111; Latanya Sweeney, Achieving k-Anonymity Privacy Protection Using Gener-
alization and Suppression, 10 INT’L J. ON UNCERTAINTY, FUZZINESS & 
KNOWLEDGE-BASED SYSTEMS 571 (2002). 
 4.  Ann Cavoukian & Khaled El Emam, Dispelling the Myths Surrounding 
De-identification: Anonymization Remains a Strong Tool for Protecting Privacy, 
June 2011, available at https://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/anonymiza-
tion.pdf. 
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identifiable information, which triggers a set of legal and reg-
ulatory protections, continues to rage, with scientists and reg-
ulators frequently referring to certain categories of infor-
mation as “personal” even as businesses and trade groups 
define them as “de-identified” or “non-personal.”  The stakes in 
the debate are high.  While not foolproof, de-identification tech-
niques unlock value by enabling important public and private 
research, allowing for the maintenance and use—and, in cer-
tain cases, sharing and publication—of valuable information, 
while mitigating privacy risk.  Appendix A to the Article pro-
vides examples of such use cases, which would be disrupted if 
policymakers pursued a less practical approach to de-identifi-
cation.5 
This Article proposes parameters for calibrating legal 
rules to data depending on multiple gradations of identifiabil-
ity, while also assessing other factors such as an organization’s 
safeguards and controls, as well as the data’s sensitivity, ac-
cessibility and permanence.  It builds on emerging scholarship 
that suggests that rather than treat data as a black or white 
dichotomy, policymakers should view data in various shades of 
gray; and provides guidance on where to place important legal 
and technical boundaries between categories of identifiability. 
This Article recognizes that if data protection law defines 
personally identifiable information broadly, capturing any 
“singling out” of individuals and including data that any pre-
sent or future third party could conceivably use to identify an 
individual, the law must be relaxed and allow for different 
types of consent; or for use restrictions tethered to the actual 
state of the data.  Alternatively, if data protection law defines 
personally identifiable information more narrowly, there will 
be a need to establish or encourage rules for the collection and 
use of data sets that are not explicitly personal, yet do allow 
for decisions to be made that can affect individuals. 
The Article urges the development of policy that creates 
incentives for organizations to avoid explicit identification and 
deploy elaborate safeguards and controls, while at the same 
time maintaining the utility of data sets.  
                                                          
 5.  See Appendix A. 
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I. THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE 
A. Nomenclature 
Despite a broad consensus around the need for and value 
of de-identification, the debate as to whether and when data 
can be said to be truly de-identified has appeared interminable.  
Although academics, regulators, and other stakeholders have 
sought for years to establish common standards for de-identi-
fication, they have so far failed to adopt even a common termi-
nology. 
As the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) observed: 
Some authors and publications use the terms ‘de-identifica-
tion’ and ‘anonymization’ interchangeably. Others use ‘de-
identification’ to describe a process and ‘anonymization’ to 
denote a specific kind of de-identification that cannot be re-
versed. In some healthcare contexts the terms ‘de-identifi-
cation’ and ‘pseudonymization’ are treated equivalently, 
with the term ‘anonymization’ being used to indicate that 
the mapping pseudonyms to subject identities has been 
erased. . .6 
The definitional ambiguity is reflected in market behavior, 
industry guidance and even legislative texts and regulatory in-
terpretations.  In privacy policies, companies often refer to data 
as de-identified or non-personal if it does not contain explicit 
details, such as name or street address, or persistent identifi-
ers such as a social security or credit card number.  The privacy 
policy for the New York Times website, for example, defines as 
“non-personal” various categories of such data, including de-
vices IDs, cookies, log files and reading history, and even loca-
tion information.7  Similarly, Volkswagen’s German website 
defines personal data (personenbezogene daten) as “infor-
mation that is directly related to you, including, for example, 
your name, your address, your telephone number and your e-
mail address,” noting that “information that is not directly re-
lated to you is not personal data.” 
According to the Digital Advertising Alliance (DAA), data 
                                                          
 6.  Simson L. Garfinkel, NISTIR 8053, De-Identification of Personal Infor-
mation 2 (October 2015), http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2015/NIST.IR
.8053.pdf. 
 7.  Privacy Policy, NEW YORK TIMES June 10, 2015, http://www.ny-
times.com/content/help/rights/privacy/policy/privacy-policy.html. 
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are de-identified “when an entity has taken reasonable steps 
to ensure that the data cannot reasonably be re-associated or 
connected to an individual or connected to or be associated with 
a particular computer or device.”8  Meanwhile, the Network 
Advertising Initiative (NAI), an industry self-regulatory 
framework, distinguishes between personally identifiable in-
formation (PII), defined as “data that is used, or intended to be 
used, to identify a particular individual,” non-PII, defined as 
“data that is not linked, or reasonably linkable, to an individ-
ual, but is linked or reasonably linkable to a particular com-
puter or device,” and de-identified data, defined as “data that 
is not linkable to either an individual or a device.”9 
Regulators too differ in their perception of de-identifica-
tion.  According to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), data 
are not “reasonably linkable” to individual identity to the ex-
tent that a company: (1) takes reasonable measures to ensure 
that the data are de-identified; (2) publicly commits not to try 
to re-identify the data; and (3) contractually prohibits down-
stream recipients from trying to re-identify the data (the 
“Three-Part Test”).10  Under the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act (HIPAA), de-identification is a term of 
art recognized under either an expert determination using gen-
erally accepted statistical and scientific principles and meth-
ods for rendering information not individually identifiable, or 
a safe harbor method based on removing from the data eight-
een enumerated fields. 
In Europe, regulators avoid the term de-identification al-
together, and instead employ a strict version of anonymization 
that leaves little room for nuance.  In its opinion on the term 
“personal data,” the Article 29 Working Party interpreted the 
term “anonymized data” as “anonymous data that previously 
referred to an identifiable person, but where that identification 
is no longer possible.”11 The concept of pseudonymity, which is 
                                                          
 8.  DIGITAL ADVERTISING ALLIANCE, SELF REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR 
MULTI-SITE DATA, Nov. 2011, http://www.aboutads.info/resource/down-
load/Multi-Site-Data-Principles.pdf. 
 9.  NETWORK ADVERTISING INITIATIVE, 2015 UPDATE TO THE NAI CODE OF 
CONDUCT 3, available at https://www.networkadvertising.org/sites/de-
fault/files/NAI_Code15encr.pdf. 
 10.  FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN 
ERA OF RAPID CHANGE 21 (2012), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-con-
sumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf. 
 11.  WORKING PARTY, ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY OPINION 5/2014 ON 
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defined in an ISO technical specification as a “particular type 
of anonymization that both removes the association with a 
data subject and adds an association between a particular set 
of characteristics relating to the data subject and one or more 
pseudonyms,”12 is recognized in German law.13  It has 
reemerged under the new text of the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR), albeit with ambiguous legal conse-
quences.14 
The force driving these discussions into definitional dead-
ends is the profound legal implication of defining data as per-
sonally identifiable or not.  As one scholar put it, anonymiza-
tion is ubiquitous, trusted and rewarded by law.15  In the cur-
rent legal frameworks of both the U.S. and the EU, data 
identifiability—rolled into the term “personal data” in EU law 
or “PII” in the U.S.—operates as a forceful legal trigger.  Once 
data are viewed as personally identifiable, they become subject 
to the full panoply of legal obligations and restrictions.16  Ac-
cordingly, organizations around the world have structured 
their internal and external privacy policies and practices 
around variations of “PII”—and its converse, de-identified 
data—locking themselves into a binary that does not accu-
rately reflect how data are treated in practice. 
                                                          
ANONYMIZATION TECHNIQUES 8 (April 10, 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommenda-
tion/files/2014/wp216_en.pdf. 
 12.  International Organization for Standardization, ISO/TS 25237:2008 
Health informatics – Pseudonymization, http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_de-
tail?csnumber=42807. 
 13.  Section 3(6a) of the German Data Protection Act, Bundesdatenschutzge-
setz, defines “Aliasing” as “replacing a person’s name and other identifying char-
acteristics with a label, in order to preclude identification of the data subject or 
to render such identification substantially difficult.” 
 14.  REGULATION (EU) NO 2016/679 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF 
THE COUNCIL OF APRIL 27, 2016, on the protection of individuals with regard to 
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and re-
pealing Directive 95/46/EC  (General Data Protection Regulation) (Text with EEA 
relevance), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/reform/files/regula-
tion_oj_en.pdf. 
 15.  Ohm, supra note 2. 
 16.  Although, note that the “full panoply” in the US is markedly less than in 
EU.  Paul Schwartz & Dan Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept 
of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 NYU L. REV. 1814 (2011); Elosie Grat-
ton, If Personal Information Is Privacy’s Gatekeeper, then Risk of Harm is the Key: 
A Proposed Method for Determining What Counts as Personal Information, 24 
ALBANY L.J. SCI. & TECH. (2013). 
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To help ease the bind created by this entrenched nomen-
clature, leading scholars have called for recognition of a 
broader spectrum.  Solove and Schwartz, for example, proposed 
a “PII 2.0” continuum, which effectively converts the existing 
dichotomy into a trichotomy, with data categorized as “identi-
fied, identifiable, or non-identifiable.”17  While allowing for 
more flexibility than current laws, this proposal warrants ex-
pansion to account for multiple shades of de-identified data 
and the legal issues arising in each case. 
To steer clear of this terminological fray, this article ap-
plies loose headings to various data categories in order to dis-
tinguish them from one another rather than to stake a claim 
as to whether they fit within any given regulatory framework. 
B. Sustainability 
Notwithstanding disagreements around nomenclature, 
some critics contend that true de-identification is not possible, 
or at least is not sustainable.  Rather than focus on how to de-
identify personal information, the discussion has increasingly 
shifted to whether personal information can be (or can be said 
to be) “de-identified” and thus not personally identifiable. 
To prove this point, commentators rely on several well-
publicized attacks against purportedly de-identified data-
bases, which led to the successful re-identification of certain 
individuals.  Some of the most (in)famous examples of re-iden-
tification arose from the public release of AOL search data,18 a 
Massachusetts medical database,19 Netflix recommenda-
tions,20 and an open genomics database.21  In each of these 
cases, “even though administrators had removed any data 
                                                          
 17.  Paul Schwartz & Dan Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Con-
cept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 NYU L. REV. 1814 (2011); Elosie 
Gratton, If Personal Information Is Privacy’s Gatekeeper, then Risk of Harm is the 
Key: A Proposed Method for Determining What Counts as Personal Information, 
24 ALBANY L.J. SCI. & TECH. (2013). 
 18.  Michael Barbaro & Tom Zeller, A Face Is Exposed for AOL Searcher No. 
4417749, NY. 
TIMES, Aug. 9, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/09/technology/09aol.html. 
 19.  Latanya Sweeney, Uniqueness of Simple Demographics in the U.S. Pop-
ulation, 
(Laboratory for International Data Privacy, Working Paper No. 4, 2000). 
 20.  Narayanan & Shmatikov, supra note 3. 
 21.  M Gymrek, A.L. McGuire et al, Identifying personal genomes by surname 
inference, 339 SCIENCE 312 (2013). 
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fields they thought might uniquely identify individuals, re-
searchers . . . unlocked identity by discovering pockets of sur-
prising uniqueness remaining in the data.”22  At the same time, 
supporters of de-identification pointed out that only a handful 
of thousands or millions of records were re-identified.23 
More generally, scientists have demonstrated that leakage 
of apparently benign information, such as the publication of 
photos of celebrities boarding NYC cabs,24 can lead to an unex-
pected unraveling of de-identification efforts.  Repeatedly, re-
searchers have shown that in a big data world, even mundane 
data points, such as the battery life remaining on an individ-
ual’s phone, can serve as potent identifiers singling out an in-
dividual from the crowd.25 
Given the sophistication of the data handlers in these 
cases and the repeated success of re-identification attacks, crit-
ics concluded that “de-identification fails to resist inference of 
sensitive information either in theory or in practice,” adding 
that “attempts to quantify its efficacy are unscientific and pro-
mote a false sense of security.”26  In its report, the President’s 
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) con-
cluded that “Anonymization remains somewhat useful as an 
added safeguard, but it is not robust against near‐term future 
re-identification methods. PCAST does not see it as being a 
useful basis for policy.”27 
At the same time, defenders of de-identification argued 
that these attacks have all been on databases that were not 
                                                          
 22.  Ohm, supra note 2 at 1723. 
 23.  Kathleen Benitez & Bradley K. Malin, Evaluating Re-Identification 
Risks With Respect to the HIPAA Privacy Rule, 17 J. AMER. MED INFORMATICS 
ASSOC. 169 (2010); Deborah Lafkey, The Safe Harbor Method of Deidentification: 
An Empirical Test 19, 2009, www.ehcca.com/presentations/HIPAAWest4/
lafky_2.pdf; Khaled El Emam et al, A Systematic Review of Re-Identification At-
tacks on Health Data, 6 PLoS One 1, December 2011. 
 24.  Anthony Tockar, Riding with the Stars: Passenger Privacy in the NYC 
Taxicab Data Set, September 15, 2014, http://research.neustar.biz/au-
thor/atockar. 
 25.  Lukasz Olejnik, Gunes Acar, Claude Castelluccia & Claudia Diaz, The 
Leaking Battery: A Privacy Analysis of the HTML5 Battery Status API, 2015, 
http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/616.pdf. 
 26.  Arvind Narayanan & Ed Felten, No Silver Bullet: De-Identification Still 
Doesn’t Work, July 9, 2014, http://randomwalker.info/publications/no-silver-bul-
let-de-identification.pdf. 
 27.  PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
(PCAST), BIG DATA AND PRIVACY: A TECHNOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE, May 2014, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/micro-
sites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_big_data_and_privacy_-_may_2014.pdf. 
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credibly de-identified to begin with28 and have “distort[ed] the 
de-identification policy debate because they are not repre-
sentative or have been misrepresented in popular media.”29  
Rather, they claimed, in these cases, the datasets were either 
mislabeled pseudonymous or at least inadequately de-identi-
fied, and should therefore not be used to undermine respect for 
more rigorous de-identification measures.  Underlying this re-
buttal, however, is an even more deep-seated disagreement 
over what it actually means for there to be re-identification 
risk and what the implications are of a record being re-identi-
fied.30  Until these goal posts are firmly set, it seems likely that 
re-identification discussions will continue to spin in circles.  In 
the meantime, businesses continue to employ de-identification 
techniques to reduce privacy risks, and policymakers must de-
cide how to treat such relatively—if not entirely foolproof—de-
identified information. 
C. Law 
While policymakers have frequently tried to draw bright 
lines around personally identifiable data, there is little con-
sistency in what is or is not considered legally de-identified un-
der the law. 
1. Federal Trade Commission 
In the U.S., the FTC has acknowledged the broad consen-
sus that “the traditional distinction between PII and non-PII 
has blurred and that it is appropriate to more comprehensively 
examine data to determine the data’s privacy implications.”31  
The FTC’s current de-identification standard hinges on 
whether there is “a reasonable level of justified confidence that 
the data cannot reasonably be used to infer information about, 
or otherwise be linked to, a particular consumer, computer, or 
                                                          
 28.  Daniel Barth-Jones, The Antidote for “Anecdata”: A Little Science Can 
Separate Data Privacy Facts from Folklore, Nov. 21, 2014, https://blogs.law.har-
vard.edu/infolaw/2014/11/21/the-antidote-for-anecdata-a-little-science-can-sepa-
rate-data-privacy-facts-from-folklore/. 
 29.  Rubinstein & Hartzog, supra note 1. 
 30.  NISTIR, supra note 6.  Including whether re-identification must actually 
occur, or whether a probability of re-identification is sufficient; whether any or 
all records must be identifiable; and what level of confidence is needed to declare 
a data set either de- or re-identified. 
 31.  FTC, supra note 10, at 2. 
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other device.”32  To determine when data are not “reasonably 
linkable,” the FTC has established the Three-Part Test.33  The 
FTC further advises that “the nature of the data at issue and 
the purposes for which it will be used are also relevant.  Thus, 
for example, whether a company publishes data externally af-
fects whether the steps it has taken to de-identify data are con-
sidered reasonable.”34  Confusingly, this standard would treat 
data linked to a particular device as personal, assuming per-
haps that all devices are unique to individuals.  Certainly com-
puters, cellphones and tablets will qualify, but in today’s “in-
ternet of things” environment many unique devices have no 
association to any particular individual. 
2. HIPAA 
The most elaborate regulatory scheme for de-identification 
is set forth by HIPAA, which provides that organizations may 
deem health data “de-identified” by removing eighteen catego-
ries of identifiers from a data file, after which data can be re-
leased publicly.35  Such data can include a special purpose code 
of identification allowing the organization that created the 
data to re-identify individuals, as long as the identifier is not 
related to information about the individual and cannot be used 
by others to identify the individual.36  If the data are shared 
under contractual protections for limited research, public 
health, or health care operations, the data may include specific 
dates and other indirect identifiers.37  But in neither case can 
an IP address be included.38 
                                                          
 32.  FTC, supra note 10, at 21. 
 33.  FTC, supra note 10, at 21. 
 34.  FTC, supra note 10, at 21.  The FTC also requires that a company must 
publicly commit to maintain and use the data in a de-identified fashion, and not 
to attempt to re-identify the data, and to impose similar restrictions by contract 
on any third party data recipient. 
 35.  See 45 CFR § 164.514(b)(2); see also Office of Civil Rights, Health & Hu-
man Services, Guidance Regarding Methods for De-Identification of Protected 
Health Information in Accordance with the Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule 7-8 (November 26, 2012), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/ understanding/covere-
dentities/De-identification/hhs_deid_guidance.pdf 
 36.  Id. at 21-22. 
 37.  OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, OCR HIPAA 
PRIVACY: RESEARCH (June 5, 2013), http://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/
ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/special/research/research.pdf 
 38.  See 45 CFR § 164.514(b)(2)(i)(P); 45 CFR § 164.514(e)(2)(xiv). 
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3. European Data Protection Directive 
In Europe, policymakers use the term anonymization, as 
opposed to de-identification.  The European Data Protection 
Directive defines anonymization negatively, noting that its 
provisions “shall not apply to data rendered anonymous in 
such a way that the data subject is no longer identifiable,” 
where “an identifiable person is one who can be identified, di-
rectly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifica-
tion number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, 
physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social iden-
tity.”39  The Data Protection Directive does not mention the 
term pseudonymisation at all. 
Among European Union Member States, anonymization 
and pseudonymization have been a “major area of divergent 
interpretation,” as the European Commission’s staff noted in 
an evaluation of the implementation of the Data Protection Di-
rective.40  According to that report, several EU Member States 
(e.g., Austria, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands and UK), “con-
sider encoded or pseudonymised data as identifiable—and thus 
as personal data—in relation to the actors who have means 
(the ‘key’) for re-identifying the data, but not in relation to 
other persons or entities.”41 In contrast, other Member States 
(e.g., Denmark, France, Italy, Spain, Sweden), regard any data 
that can possibly be linked to an individual by any third party 
as “personal,” even in the hands of someone who has no rea-
sonable means for such re-identification.42  However, regula-
tors “in those Member States apply less demanding obligations 
with regard to the processing of data that is not immediately 
identifiable, taking into account the likelihood of re-identifica-
tion.”43 
According to guidance it issued, the Article 29 Working 
Party assesses anonymization primarily according to technical 
                                                          
 39.  Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data, OFFICIAL JOURNAL L 281 , 
23/11/1995 P. 0031 – 0050, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ
/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML (“Data Protection Di-
rective”). 
 40.  European Council, Annex 2, Evaluation of the Implementation of the 
Data Protection Directive 244 (2012), available at http://lobbyplag.eu/govern-
ments/assets/pdf_all/CD-all.pdf 
 41.  Id. at 15. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. 
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measures.44  While cogently presenting the technical issues 
and privacy risks inherent in de-identification, the Article 29 
Working Party’s understanding of acceptable re-identification 
risk has been understood by some as requiring near-zero prob-
ability, an impractical standard.45 
As demonstrated below, the various drafts of the GDPR 
reflect an ambivalence towards pseudonymization and anony-
mization.46  The final draft defines anonymous information as 
“information which does not relate to an identified or identifi-
able natural person” and “to data rendered anonymous in such 
a way that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable.”47  
Importantly—and similar to the Article 29 Working Party po-
sition—it calibrates the concept of identifiability to an organi-
zation’s ability to “single out” an individual based on a piece of 
information. 
II. A SPECTRUM OF PERSONAL DATA 
While the rhetorical and policy debates surrounding de-
identification fulminate, organizations continue to employ a 
range of techniques and controls to de-identify, obscure, and 
protect their data.  These methods offer widely varying levels 
of protection and obscurity, depending on the context of their 
use.  Too often, they have become square pegs forced into the 
round, all-or-nothing holes of the current PII framework.  In 
order to help advance the discussions around practical de-iden-
tification, this paper examines the range of practices and pro-
poses a reclassification of data on a spectrum according to dif-
fering categories of identifiability.  A more nuanced 
understanding of how organizations are protecting their data 
on the ground will help the de-identification community better 
assess and respond to both data opportunities and privacy 
risks. 
                                                          
 44.  Article 29, supra note 11. 
 45.  See, e.g., Khaled El Emam & Cecilia Alvarez, A Critical Appraisal of the 
Article 29 Working Party Opinion 05/2014 on Data Anonymization Techniques, 
Int’l Data Privacy Law (Dec. 13, 2014),  http://idpl.oxfordjournals.org/content/
early/2014/12/12/idpl.ipu033.full.pdf?keytype=ref&ijkey=K8xdZaj1rw3EzDx. 
 46.  See infra notes 79-86 and accompanying text. 
 47.  GDPR, Rec. 23. 
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A. The Variables 
In order to redraw the de-identification spectrum, it is im-
portant to first understand the difference between direct and 
indirect identifiers, as well as how de-identified data sets are 
commonly shared or made public.  Different combinations of 
these parameters account for the different categories of data 
described below. 
1. Direct Identifiers 
Data about an individual can identify that individual ei-
ther directly or indirectly.  In de-identification literature, di-
rect identifiers are “data that can be used to identify a person 
without additional information or with cross-linking through 
other information that is in the public domain.”48  These in-
clude names, social security numbers, or basic contact infor-
mation.  Clearly, in order to render data non-personal, these 
obvious identity fragments must be removed or altered.  Some 
common methods of addressing direct identifiers include their 
suppression or replacement with symbols, generic names, or 
random values.49  If a direct identifier is consistently replaced 
with another specific value it becomes a pseudonym, which al-
lows linking information belonging to an individual across 
multiple data records or information systems, provided that 
similar direct identifiers are systematically pseudonymized.50 
2. Indirect Identifiers 
Data that identifies an individual indirectly helps connect 
pieces of information until a particular individual can be sin-
gled out. Some of the most common indirect identifiers (also 
known as quasi-identifiers) include date of birth, age, gender, 
ZIP code, and other basic demographic information.  No single 
individual can be identified based on any one of these data 
points.  Yet, as additional indirect identifiers compound, an 
identity can emerge.  As leading researchers have pointed out, 
“Whereas direct identifiers can be removed from the dataset, 
quasi-identifiers generally convey some sort of information 
that might be important for a later analysis and removing 
them may damage the utility of the dataset.”51  Common ways 
                                                          
 48.  ISO/TS 25237:2008(E), supra note 12, at 3. 
 49.  NISTIR, supra note 6. 
 50.  NISTIR, supra note 6. 
 51.  NISTIR, supra note 6 at 20. 
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to de-identify indirect identifiers include: suppressing or re-
moval; generalizing values as sets or ranges; swapping data 
between individual records; and perturbing or adding noise.52 
3. Controls and Safeguards on the Use of Data 
In addition to the nature of identifiers, a framework for 
practical de-identification also takes into account the safe-
guards and controls placed on the way data are obtained, used 
or disseminated.53  There are a several typical models for re-
leasing de-identified data, including: “Release and Forget 
model,” where data are published publicly or made available 
on the internet; “Data Use Agreements model,” where data are 
provided under legally binding contracts detailing how data 
may and may not be used (typically either in a negotiated 
agreement with a “qualified investigator” or via “click-through” 
license agreements); and the “Enclave model,” where data are 
“kept in some kind of segregated enclave that accepts queries 
from qualified researchers, runs the queries on the de-identi-
fied data, and responds with results.”54 
Non-technical safeguards and controls include two broad 
categories: 1) internal administrative and physical controls (in-
ternal controls)55; and 2) external contractual and legal protec-
tions (external controls).56  Internal controls encompass secu-
rity policies, access limits, employee training, data segregation 
guidelines, and data deletion practices that aim to stop confi-
dential information from being exploited or leaked to the pub-
lic.  External controls involve contractual terms that restrict 
how partners use and share information, and the correspond-
ing remedies and auditing rights to ensure compliance.57  By 
implementing administrative safeguards, organizations pro-
vide important privacy protections independent of technical 
de-identification.  Policymakers in the U.S. and Europe have 
recognized the value of such safeguards and controls, setting 
forth de-identification standards that factor in various types of 
safeguards to meet legal tests such as reasonableness (FTC) or 
                                                          
 52.  NISTIR, supra note 6 at 20. 
 53.  NISTIR, supra note 6. 
 54.  NISTIR, supra note 6 at 14. 
 55.  See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(10) (2011). 
 56.  See discussion in Yianni Lagos & Jules Polonetsky, Public vs. Nonpublic 
Data: The Benefits of Administrative Control, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 103 
(2013). 
 57.  Id. at 106. 
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“likely reasonably to be used” (EU). 
B. Common Categories of Data 
In the table on the following page, “A Visual Guide to Prac-
tical Data De-Identification,” we delineate common categories 
of data as proposed sign posts on the de-identification spec-
trum, based on the parameters identified above—the existence 
of direct or indirect identifiers as well as the safeguards and 
controls over dissemination.58 
  
                                                          
 58.  For a similar framing see Khaled El Emam, Eloïse Gratton & Jules Pol-
onetsky, The Seven States of Data (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). 
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III. KEY INFLECTION POINTS ON THE DATA SPECTRUM 
A. Explicitly Personal Data 
At one end of the spectrum, a dataset contains direct iden-
tifiers thus making the data Explicitly Personal.  Data fall into 
this category when no attempt has been made to obscure either 
direct or indirect identifiers.  This information is typically con-
sidered PII under current legal regimes whether or not safe-
guards around sharing or use controls are present.59 Even at 
this extreme, however, not all personal data are created 
equal.60  For example, although an email address may be just 
as quick to identify an individual as a social security number, 
the latter is still considered more sensitive given its persis-
tence, resistance to change, and common use as a key to addi-
tional sets of PII.  Similarly, not all names are created equal.  
Some names are unique enough to identify an individual in a 
small crowd; others, like John Smith, are so prevalent that 
standing on their own they do not constitute personally identi-
fiable information. 
B. Potentially Identifiable and Not Readily Identifiabile 
Data 
When an attempt has been made to obscure or avoid col-
lecting explicit direct identifiers, data slides down the identifi-
ability spectrum.  This is the case, for example, when a com-
pany decides to use a customer’s static device ID in lieu of their 
name or social security number, or to hash a customer’s email 
address. Such partially masked data may still be identifiable 
since it could allow the company to single out specific individ-
uals; but it is less explicit or risky than data stored with a 
user’s name and real-world identity attached.  The Potentially 
Identifiable category captures data that may not be explicitly 
personal, but that has been only partially masked as to be po-
tentially identifiable. Like the Explicitly Personal category, Po-
tentially Identifiable data leaves indirect identifiers intact and 
                                                          
 59.  See, e.g., GDPR Art. 4(1); Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2710(a)(3) (2006). 
 60.  For example, one website indicates that there are 46,576 people named 
John Smith in the U.S., but only four people named Kelsey Finch and only one 
Jules Polonetsky and one Omer Tene. How Many of Me, howmanyofme.com, last 
visited Apr. 11, 2016. 
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applies limited or no safeguards and controls on sharing, pub-
lication or use of information.61 
Potentially Identifiable data are widely used in a variety 
of online and mobile ecosystems, and include cookies with 
unique IDs, device identifiers, MAC and IP addresses, adver-
tising identifiers, and common hashes of such data.  One of the 
most contentious discussions in the de-identification debate re-
volves around the role of such device identifiers, which are di-
rect yet not explicitly tied to real-world identities 
On the one hand, businesses have relied on device identi-
fiers for a range of tracking and targeting activities, while re-
ferring to them as “anonymous,” “non-personal,” “de-identi-
fied” or similar terms. Advertising industry standards today 
consider such data as non-PII.62 
On the other hand, many regulators and technologists con-
sider such identifiers to be personally identifiable.  For exam-
ple, the Article 29 Working Party asserts, “If pseudonymiza-
tion is based on the substitution of an identity by another 
unique code, the presumption that this constitutes a robust de-
identification is naïf and does not take into account the com-
plexity of identification methodologies and the multifarious 
contexts where they might be applied.”63  In similar vein, the 
text of the GDPR grounds the very notion of identifiability on 
a company’s ability to “single out” an individual, regardless of 
whether such an identity is linked to a real-world identifier 
such as name or address.64 
The FTC has clarified its view that device-linked infor-
mation is personally identifiable.65  Where it has rulemaking 
authority (under COPPA), the agency expressly defined such 
identifiers as PII.66  In a non-COPPA context, the FTC’s posi-
                                                          
 61.  In the Not Readily Identifiable category, similar data are subject to more 
controls. 
 62.  See, e.g., privacy policies supra notes 7-8. 
 63.  Article 29 WP at 31, supra note 11. 
 64.  General Data Protection Regulation, rec. 23. 
 65.  See recently, FTC Press Release, Two App Developers Settle FTC Charges 
They Violated Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, Dec. 17, 2015, 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/12/two-app-developers-set-
tle-ftc-charges-they-violated-childrens?utm_source=govdelivery. 
 66.  FTC, Complying with COPPA: Frequently Asked Questions, A Guide for 
Business and Parents and Small Entity Compliance Guide, March 2015, 
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/complying-coppa-fre-
quently-asked-questions#General Questions. 
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tion on whether such data is personally identifiable will de-
pend on satisfaction of the Three-Part Test, including the ex-
istence of technological and legal controls and user choices.67 
Importantly, if policymakers completely disregarded such 
means of obfuscation, companies would lose any incentive to 
deploy them.  Consequently, in practice, policymakers recog-
nize the need to use and exchange such device identifiers for 
various purposes, as well as their being less explicit than direct 
identifiers such as name and address.  Some regulators have 
informally sanctioned the sharing of such device identifiers for 
limited purposes or subject to use restrictions. 
For example, in 2009, the German data protection author-
ity in Hamburg passed a resolution that made the analysis of 
user behavior tied to a full IP address permissible only with a 
user’s explicit consent.68  In apparent violation of these new 
rules, most web analytics services, including market leader 
Google Analytics, which gather such information as a matter 
of course, did not have the practices in place to gather such 
consent.  Rather than oust these services entirely, the Ham-
burg DPA entered into a binding resolution with Google in 
2011 implementing certain—but not all—of data protection’s 
legal obligations.69  These measures included allowing users to 
opt out, enabling website operators to request that any IP ad-
dresses collected be “anonymized” by deleting the last digits, 
and requiring data processing agreements to be executed be-
tween Google and website operators using Google Analytics.  
Website operators were also required to inform users about the 
use of Google Analytics in their privacy policies, including no-
tice of the opt out, and to delete data collected using previous, 
non-compliant analytics profiles.70 
A complete discussion of the factors that turn an item of 
data into a direct identifier is beyond the scope of this paper.  
Clearly, the existence and prevalence of a look-up database 
render an identifier direct. For purposes of the discussion here, 
suffice it to note that not all identifiers are created equal.  For 
                                                          
 67.  FTC, supra note 10 at 21. 
 68.  Hamburg Data Protection Authority: Data protection-conforming use of 
Google Analytics, IITR.us (Oct. 29, 2011), http://www.iitr.us/publications/35-
hamburg-data-protection-authority-data-protection-conforming-use-of-google-
analytics.html. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
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example, some identifiers are reversible only by the organiza-
tion holding the data, while others have public look-up data-
bases.  One identifier might be easily cleared by users, for ex-
ample, by deleting their cookie file, while another could be 
hard-coded or only clearable by resetting a user’s device.  One 
identifier might be stored only locally, while another is shared 
globally.  A persistent unique identifier, which can be used over 
time to compile an increasingly detailed profile of an individual 
or device, entails different privacy risk than a special identifier 
that is dynamically reassigned to multiple individuals and reg-
ularly rotated. 
Thus emerges the next category, Not Readily Identifiable 
data, which recognizes that adding significant safeguards and 
controls to partially masked identifiers can make such data 
less readily identifiable.  Critics will likely challenge the char-
acterization of an identifier, such as a unique cookie ID or de-
vice ID, as “non personal,” if it is shared widely, cannot be de-
leted by users, or is in fact commonly linked by companies to 
personal information.  But if an identifier can be cleared by a 
user, its dissemination and retention controlled, and strong 
technical and legal constraints prevent it from being linked to 
personal information—it should slide an additional step down 
the identifiability spectrum and warrant a more flexible legal 
regime.71 
Regulators could take advantage of these gradations of 
identifiability to impose more nuanced use restrictions, similar 
to self-regulatory frameworks in the U.S.  The NAI Code of 
Conduct, for example, applies obligations for notice, choice, 
opt-out, and non-discrimination to datasets defined as “non-
personal”—that is, neither anonymous nor obviously person-
ally identifiable.72  The DAA Self-Regulatory Principles also set 
forth protections for pseudonymous identifiers, determining 
that “data is not considered PII under the Principles if the data 
is not used in an identifiable manner.”73  Here, collection in 
isolation of an IP address, for example, is not considered pro-
                                                          
 71.  Given adequate perturbation of indirect identifiers and the presence suf-
ficient controls, including requirements to not re-identify data and to require any 
downstream recipients to make the same commitment, such data may be charac-
terized under as De-Identified data (see below) and satisfy the FTC de-identifica-
tion standard. 
 72.  NAI, supra note 9. 
 73.  DAA, supra note 8. 
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cessing of PII, and thus does not require consent or transpar-
ency even if used for online behavioral advertising, but is con-
sidered PII subject to the full set of Principles when it is “in 
fact linked to an individual in its collection and use.”74  Mean-
while, under the Mobile Location Analytics Code of Conduct, 
organizations are required to provide in-store notice, hash mo-
bile device ID MAC addresses and set discrimination and re-
tention limits around non-personal but not de-identified sets of 
“de-personalized” data.75 
To be sure, at the end of the day the devil is in the detail.  
Much turns on where the borders are drawn between Explicitly 
Personal, Potentially Identifiable, and Not Readily Identifiable 
data, as well as on the safeguards and controls that apply to 
the various categories of data.  But clearly, a more nuanced 
approach than categorizing data in all of these categories as 
personally identifiable would provide organizations with an in-
centive to enhance privacy protection by pushing data down 
the identifiablity spectrum. 
C. Key-Coded 
Key-coded data could reside in several categories.  Key-
coded data are personally identifiable information that have 
been stripped of direct identifiers, which have been replaced by 
a key to avoid unwanted or unintended re-identification.  Be-
cause the data are so readily re-identifiable by the key holder, 
they must be considered personal data and fall under Explic-
itly Personal or Potentially Identifiable when they are in that 
party’s hands.  To any other party, however, key-coded data 
would fall within the Pseudonymous or De-Identified catego-
ries and be considered non-personally identifiable, depending 
on the treatment of any indirect identifiers in the dataset.  In 
other words, a key-coded dataset could be viewed as a Pseu-
donymous dataset, with particularly strong controls allowing 
dissemination of the key to only a restricted subset of players 
(e.g., researchers).  The strength of the key should play a factor 
in the analysis, distinguishing between encryption-based key 
allocation that could conceivably be reversed by an adversary 
and randomly mapped keys that can survive an attack. 
                                                          
 74.  DAA, supra note 8. 
 75.  Future of Privacy Forum, Mobile Location Analytics Code of Conduct, Oc-
tober 2013, http://www.futureofprivacy.org/wp-content/uploads/10.22.13-FINAL-
MLA-Code.pdf. 
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Key-coded data are used extensively in a range of circum-
stances where limited re-identification is necessary or desira-
ble, including pharmaceutical research, scientific and histori-
cal research, marketing analysis, and online and mobile 
services.  For example, in clinical trials, health institutions 
typically must maintain an ability to link research data back 
to specific patients, in order to alert them of a treatable condi-
tion they discover or contain the spread of an infectious dis-
ease.76 In online advertising, in contrast, intermediaries com-
pare hashed data from different sources to identify matches 
without having to reveal an individual user’s identity to any of 
the transacting parties.77 
It is important for policymakers to recognize the difference 
between key-coded data in the hands of the curator who also 
holds the key, and similar data in the hands of a researcher or 
other third party who cannot reasonably “unlock” it.  Under 
the European Data Protection Directive, “to determine 
whether a person is identifiable, account should be taken of all 
the means likely reasonably to be used either by the controller 
or by any other person.”78  The same formula remains in Recital 
26 of the GDPR.  A strict reading of this language would im-
pute re-identification to third parties who do not hold a key, 
based on the capabilities of the party who first coded the data. 
In practice, access to key-coded research data is highly re-
stricted, with administrative safeguards and legal controls as 
well as reputational barriers limiting access to just verified us-
ers.  If regulators fail to offer credit to such controls and instead 
choose to treat all key-coded data as if it were readily identifi-
able, they would inevitably impair critical scientific research.  
Researchers would be forced to sacrifice useful data to meet 
more cumbersome de-identification standards, even though 
they would be no more or less capable of re-identifying the data 
than before. 
                                                          
 76.  Adrian Thorogood et al., An implementation framework for the feedback 
of individual research results and incidental findings in research, BMC Med Eth-
ics. 2014; 15: 88, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4391472/. 
 77.  ZE ZOOK & PR SMITH, MARKETING COMMUNICATIONS: OFFLINE AND 
ONLINE INTEGRATION, ENGAGEMENT AND ANALYTICS 363 (2016). 
 78.  Data Protection Directive, Recital 26 (emphasis added). 
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D. Pseudonymous and Protected Pseudonymous Data 
Data in one sector of this category are vanilla Pseudony-
mous data, meaning information in which direct identifiers 
have been eliminated or transformed, but indirect identifiers 
remain intact without safeguards or controls over their release.  
When organizations overlay such data with safeguards and 
controls, the data move further down the identifiability spec-
trum to Protected Pseudonymous data.  Limited data sets un-
der the HIPAA are an example of data in this category.  They 
comprise Protected Health Information (PHI) that excludes di-
rect identifiers and various categories of indirect identifiers, 
but explicitly includes other indirect identifiers that must be 
scrubbed under the HIPAA de-identification Safe Harbor 
standard, including dates, city, state, zip code, and age.  They 
may be used or disclosed subject to strict use agreements, for 
purposes of research, public health, or health care operations.  
We distinguish Pseudonymous data from Potentially Identifi-
able or Not Readily Identifiable data in that Pseudonymous 
data does not contain any direct identifiers that can be used to 
link data across contexts.  In the Pseudonymous category, data 
can be linked strictly to an ad hoc identifier that has no life 
outside of the specific context in which it is used. 
“Pseudonymous” is, admittedly, a highly contentious term 
in the de-identification literature.  Technologists regard pseu-
donymization as a process for removing direct identifiers and 
replacing them with pseudonyms, that is, a “particular type of 
anonymization.”79  In contrast, the Article 29 Working Party 
stated that “pseudonymisation is not a method of anonymisa-
tion,” but rather merely reduces the linkability of a dataset to 
the original identity of a data subject, and is therefore merely 
a “useful security measure.”80 
The recently finalized GDPR split the difference, defining 
pseudonymization as “the processing of personal data in such 
a way that the data can no longer be attributed to a specific 
data subject without the use of additional information, as long 
as such additional information is kept separately and subject 
                                                          
 79.  Pseudonymization is a “particular type of anonymization that both re-
moves the association with a data subject and adds an association between a par-
ticular set of characteristics relating to the data subject and one or more pseudo-
nyms.” ISO/TS 25237:2008(E), supra note 12, at 3. 
 80.  Article 29, supra note 11, at 3 (emphasis added). 
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to technical and organisational measures to ensure non-attrib-
ution to an identified or identifiable person.”81  The GDPR rec-
ognizes that “[t]he application of pseudonymisation to personal 
data can reduce the risks for the data subjects concerned and 
help controllers and processors meet their data protection ob-
ligations.”82  At the same time, the GDPR continues to regard 
pseudonymous information as personally identifiable, provid-
ing in Recital 23, “Data which has undergone pseudonymisa-
tion, which could be attributed to a natural person by the use 
of additional information, should be considered as information 
on an identifiable natural person.”  It is important to note that 
data that the GDPR denotes pseudonymous may in certain cir-
cumstances fall under this paper’s Potentially Identifiable or 
Not Readily Identifiable categories, as opposed to its Pseudon-
ymous category, which lacks direct identifiers. 
The legal rules around pseudonymous data are equally in-
consistent.  In the U.S., pseudonymous data could in certain 
circumstances be considered de-identified under the FTC’s 
Three Part Test, depending on the controls in place and on the 
nature of a particular pseudonym.83  For example, regulators 
may check whether an identifier could be cleared or reas-
signed; whether there is an easily accessible look-up database; 
or if the data are directly derived from PII.  The negotiating 
drafts of the GDPR reveal a dispute among European policy-
makers regarding the scope and implications of pseudonymiza-
tion.  For example, the 2014 European Parliament draft would 
have assigned legal import to “pseudonymous” data by creating 
a presumption that “profiling based solely on the processing of 
pseudonymous data” does not “significantly affect the inter-
ests, rights or freedoms of the data subject.”84  Later drafts set 
                                                          
 81.  GDPR, ART. 4(3b). 
 82.  GDPR, Recital 28. 
 83.  FTC, supra note 10 at 21. 
 84.  European Parliament legislative resolution of 12 March 2014 on the pro-
posal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the pro-
tection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation) 
(COM(2012)0011 – C7-0025/2012 – 2012/0011(COD)), http://www.europarl.eu-
ropa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2014-
0212+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN (Parliament Draft); cf. European Commission, Pro-
posal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the pro-
tection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation) COM(2012) 11 
final, January 25, 2012, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/re-
view2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf (Commission Draft). 
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forth by the European Council, however, have removed this 
presumption and locked pseudonymous data in a state of legal 
limbo, defined in the law but carrying no apparent legal conse-
quence.85 
The final draft of the GDPR assigns certain advantages to 
pseudonymous data when compared to personal data.  Article 
6(3a) of the GDPR permits companies to repurpose data for an-
other compatible use, taking into account “the existence of ap-
propriate safeguards, which may include encryption or pseu-
donymisation.”  Similarly, Article 83, which sets “safeguards 
and derogations for the processing of personal data for archiv-
ing purposes in the public interest or scientific and historical 
research purposes or statistical purposes,” suggests pseudony-
mization as the primary method to effect data minimization, 
helping balance the rights of individuals against compelling 
public interests.86  Article 23 puts pseudonymization forth as 
the sole example of data protection by design and by default; 
and Article 30 suggests “pseudonymisation and encryption” as 
the primary measures of data security. 
E. De-Identified and Protected De-Identified Data 
Data in the next category are termed De-Identified, if lack-
ing additional safeguards or controls, or Protected De-Identi-
fied, where additional safeguards or controls are present.  
Here, direct and known indirect identifiers have been either 
removed or manipulated in a fashion that breaks the linkage 
between the information and the data subject.  Organizations 
often put in place safeguards on publication and use controls 
to complement and buttress their technical de-identification 
measures.  This means that the stricter the safeguards and 
controls, the less perturbed data must be to achieve a suffi-
ciently low risk of re-identification; when data are more per-
turbed, fewer controls are needed.  A significant portion of 
medical and pharmaceutical research operates on the basis of 
De-Identified data, which includes information satisfying the 
HIPAA de-identification standard. 
                                                          
 85.  Council of the European Union, Proposal for a Regulation of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard 
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General 
Data Protection Regulation), June 11, 2015, http://data.consilium.eu-
ropa.eu/doc/document/ST-9788-2015-INIT/en/pdf (“Council Draft”). 
 86. See also GDPR Recital 125. 
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De-Identified data is the focal point for much controversy 
within the technical de-identification community, based in 
large part around different views as to whether certain infor-
mation in a database is likely to be useful—now or at some 
point in the future—as an indirect identifier.  Under a strictly 
formalist view, any conceivable risk merits treating even re-
motely-potential indirect identifiers similarly to explicit PII.  
In determining whether such data are personally identifiable 
or not, regulators are confronted by difficult policy tradeoffs, 
including whether and to what extent to limit research in the 
name of privacy.  Experts who distrust any administrative 
safeguards or legal controls  frequently question the merits of 
de-identification, joined by data scientists skeptical that risk-
based de-identification is sustainable or sufficient.87 
By definition, however, and in contrast to data in the 
Anonymous category, our category of De-Identified data is in-
tended to accommodate a risk-based approach to de-identifica-
tion.  Rather than focusing on every possible attack vector, 
pragmatic organizations can calibrate the protections they af-
ford to attacks that are truly feasible or likely to be available 
to a probable attacker. 
F. Anonymous and Aggregated Anonymous Data 
Finally, data in the final category may be described as 
Anonymous, or Aggregated Anonymous, depending on the level 
of data aggregation and attendant controls.  As with the previ-
ous category, both direct and indirect identifiers have been re-
moved or transformed so that they cannot link back to any in-
dividual.  Unlike De-Identified data, however, Anonymous 
data features mathematical and technical guarantees that are 
sufficient on their own to distort the data so as to prevent re-
identification.  In the Aggregated Anonymous category, the 
data are so highly aggregated that additional safeguards or 
controls are no longer relevant (e.g., published census statis-
tics). 
Data in the Anonymous category are at the forefront of de-
identification science, and must continually confront uncer-
tainties over what it means to re-identify data.  Open questions 
within the de-identification community include: must a record 
actually be re-identified in order to discredit de-identification, 
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or is some probability of future re-identification sufficient?  
How many records need to be re-identified for a database as a 
whole to be considered broken?  Do attackers need to uncover 
a person’s name to consider a record re-identified or is it suffi-
cient for them to single out an individual from the database?  
What level of confidence is needed to declare a dataset either 
de-identified or re-identified?  What consideration should be 
given to allowing a lower level of perturbation of this data if it 
is subject to additional controls? 
The abundance of big data is believed to undermine de-
identification efforts through a combination of powerful new 
computing capabilities and ever-growing databases of periph-
eral information.  Although some indirect identifiers have re-
peatedly figured in re-identification attacks (e.g., dates, geolo-
cation, transaction codes), it may be impossible to predict 
which items of data will in the future become linkable indirect 
identifiers.  Already today, lists of movie ratings88 or the bat-
tery life of a mobile device89 have proven to be susceptible to 
linkage attacks.  At the same time, data points that can be used 
to pierce through de-identification often carry important social 
benefits in areas like healthcare, education, and science, ren-
dering their suppression undesirable. 
While researchers continue to debate these points, policy-
makers should be careful not to prove too much with the re-
identification risk argument.  If, for example, only two individ-
uals can potentially be re-identified from a database of 15,000 
patient records, for a match rate of 0.013%,90 policymakers 
must weigh those privacy risks against the societal benefit 
locked into those records.  They should account for the fact that 
overly strict de-identification rules that are geared at eliminat-
ing remote privacy risks may jeopardize valuable data uses in 
return for small privacy gains. 
                                                          
 88.  Narayanan & Shmatikov, supra note 3. 
 89.  Lukasz Olejnik et al, supra note 25; see also Alex Hern, How Your 
Smartphone’s Battery Life Can Be Used to Invade Your Privacy, THE GUARDIAN, 
August 4, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/aug/03/privacy-
smartphones-battery-life. 
 90.  Deborah Lafkey, The Safe Harbor Method of De-Identification: An Em-
pirical Test, ONC Presentation, October 8, 2009, www.ehcca.com/presenta-
tions/HIPAAWest4/lafky_2.pdf; see also discussion in Cavoukian & El Emam, su-
pra note 4, at 6. 
03 TENE FINAL 5/18/2016  4:29 PM 
620 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
IV. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
A. Sensitivity 
For the purposes of this paper, it is important to separate 
between the sensitivity of a data item and its degree of identi-
fiability.  Some risk-based models of regulation factor sensitiv-
ity into the overall determination of whether data is classified 
as “personal” or what level of risk it entails.91  In contrast, this 
paper, while recognizing that both identifiability and sensitiv-
ity affect an overall risk calculus, seeks to isolate identifiability 
as an independent characteristic of data.  Data do not become 
any more or less identifiable because of their sensitivity, alt-
hough there is some overlap between the set of direct identifi-
ers and the set of sensitive data.  Information could be highly 
sensitive yet not readily identifiable (e.g., rare medical condi-
tion), or entirely mundane but easily linkable to a specific in-
dividual (e.g., IP address).  Data that may appear to be non-
sensitive, such as a zip code, could ultimately lead to sensitive 
inferences, such as an individual’s race.  And certain infor-
mation may be deemed sensitive by one culture, but not an-
other. 
This Article suggests that in assessing risk, sensitivity 
should be taken into account only after a determination has 
been made as to identifiability; at which point, policymakers 
can overlay more nuanced legal protections based on sensitiv-
ity, whether the data are identifiable or not.  Ultimately, the 
end results of the proposed analysis may converge with those 
of a risk-based framework that takes sensitivity into account.  
For example, data may be deemed de-identified but restricted 
due to sensitivity concerns. 
B. Safeguards and Controls 
The success or failure of a de-identification framework ul-
timately rests on the efficacy of the underlying combination of 
safeguards and controls used to balance intended uses of data 
against the risk of re-identification.  Determining which con-
trols are required to assure stakeholders, including regulators 
                                                          
 91.  El Emam et al, supra note 58; see Eloïse Gratton, If Personal Information 
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and individuals, that datasets of different degrees of identifia-
bility can be used with limited privacy risks, is context specific. 
As a general rule, the more identifiable the information in 
a dataset, the more circumspect an organization should be in 
its application of security safeguards and privacy controls.  Ad-
ministrative privacy and security controls are foundational 
components of data risk analysis.  Such controls include poli-
cies, contracts, training, and data classification.  Yet adminis-
trative controls are only effective to a point.  They must be com-
plemented with rigorous technical safeguards, such as 
automated data logging, data retention restrictions, consent 
management, data analytics restrictions, encryption, access 
management, and automated data validation. 
Clearly, there is no cookie-cutter approach to the use of 
safeguards and controls.  It is therefore imperative that organ-
izations conduct a risk assessment of intended de-identifica-
tion techniques and document the rationale behind their deci-
sion making as part of their de-identification due-diligence 
CONCLUSION 
A legal system that is closely attuned to different place-
ments of data along an identifiability spectrum will enable or-
ganizations to maximize data utility while minimizing privacy 
risks.  Unfortunately, the legacy legal structures in place on 
both sides of the Atlantic continue to straightjacket policy in 
this area by insisting on a binary categorization of data and an 
all-or-nothing approach to privacy protection.  Scholars who 
suggested a layered approach, recognizing the existence of a 
middle category, have not elaborated a system to categorize 
and tailor treatment for different flavors of such information. 
This paper reframes the debate, proposing a policy model 
that reflects a reality where data lies along an identifiability 
spectrum.  It posits that for policy purposes, data should be 
categorized based on the interplay of three main variables: di-
rect identifiers, indirect identifiers and safeguards and controls 
on access and use.  It suggests that on the one hand, industry 
should refrain from referring to information that is tied to 
unique identifiers as anonymous or non-personal, if such iden-
tifiers are shared broadly or are in fact linked to personally 
identifiable information (Potentially Identifiable data).  If com-
panies set tighter controls on access to such data and provide 
consumers meaningful controls, the same information can 
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slide down the identifiability scale to merit more liberal legal 
treatment (Not Readily Identifiable data). 
Regulators, on the other hand, should recognize that pseu-
donymous data affords privacy protections, even if the extent 
of de-identification is not foolproof (Pseudonymous and Pro-
tected Pseudonymous data).  Similarly, recognizing the role of 
a combination of technological, administrative and legal con-
trols, regulators should enable researchers and scientists to 
work with de-identified data without satisfying privacy re-
quirements, such as obtaining individuals’ consent, so as not 
to impede valuable scientific and technological progress (De-
Identified and Protected De-Identified data).  Finally, anony-
mous and aggregated data should be unrestricted, with risk 
and utility factored into an assessment as to whether a certain 
data point could become a quasi identifier sometime in the fu-
ture in remote circumstances. (Anonymous and Aggregated 
Anonymous data). 
A benefit-risk assessment can provide the legal impetus to 
enable data uses depending on the category of data, intended 
uses and spectrum of re-identification risk.92  Indeed, such 
analysis is couched in existing law and implementation by pol-
icymakers and regulators on both sides of the Atlantic.  The 
FTC weighs benefits to consumers when evaluating the unfair-
ness of business practices under Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act.93  Similarly, the European Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party applied a balancing test in its opin-
ion interpreting the legitimate interest clause of the European 
Data Protection Directive.94  The GDPR puts forth pseudony-
mization as a method to protect individuals’ rights while at the 
same time permitting the repurposing of data or its use for re-
search, scientific or statistical endeavors.95  Finally, the White 
House Office of Science and Technology Policy, which has re-
cently studied the social and technical ramifications of big 
                                                          
 92.  Jules Polonetsky, Omer Tene & Joseph Jerome, Benefit-Risk Analysis for 
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http://www.futureofprivacy.org/wp-content/up-
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 93.  FTC Act, Section 5(n). 
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 95.  GDPR, Art. 6(3a), 83, rec. 125. 
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data, recognized the need to strike an appropriate balance be-
tween new opportunities and individual values.96 
New uses of data and technology have the potential to 
bring humanity a wide range of benefits, but at the same time 
to generate new and serious harms.  Setting the appropriate 
controls on data based on the potential benefits and the created 
risks requires understanding the different states of data and 
establishing appropriate rules for collection, use and controls.  
This Article advances an approach that supports benefit and 
deters risk by providing a practical framework for policymak-
ers to analyze various data sets based on their degree of iden-
tifiability. 
APPENDIX A97 
In a wide range of industries and research fields, striking 
an appropriate balance between data utility and individual pri-
vacy requires applying practical de-identification measures or 
maintaining data in varying states along the identifiability 
spectrum.  In areas such as healthcare or human subject re-
search, for example, significant ethical and legal obligations 
may necessitate an ability to re-link information to a data sub-
ject, for example in order to administer medication for a diag-
nosed disease.  In other fields, striving for complete anony-
mization can degrade the quality of data, skewing results and 
impeding the utility of important services.  The following are 
illustrative examples of real world circumstances in which 
practical de-identification plays a critical role: 
A. Educational Programs 
With the growing popularity of massive open online 
courses (MOOCs) and their promise of educational attainment 
for all, it is important for educators, policymakers, and re-
searchers to study and assess the efficacy and development of 
such programs.  In May 2014, for example: 
a team of researchers from Harvard and MIT released an 
                                                          
 96.  WHITE HOUSE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: 
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open data set containing student records from 16 courses 
conducted in the first year of the edX platform. . . The data 
set is a de-identified version of that used to publish Har-
vardX and MITx: The First Year of Open Online Courses, a 
report revealing findings about student demographics, 
course-taking patterns, certification rates, and other 
measures of student behavior.98 
The goal of releasing this data was to “allow other re-
searchers to replicate the results of the analysis and to allow 
researchers to conduct novel analyses beyond the original 
work, adding to the body of literature about open online 
courses.”99 
Voluntarily attempting to comply with FERPA’s de-iden-
tification standards for the public release of student records,100 
the Harvard and MIT researchers used k-anonymity to remove 
both direct and indirect identifiers from the records.  K-ano-
nymity is a process whereby the original dataset containing 
personally identifiable information is transformed so that it is 
difficult for an adversary to determine the identity of the indi-
viduals in that data set.101  Technically, a k-anonymized da-
taset has the property that each record is similar to at least 
another k-1 other records on the potentially identifying varia-
bles.102  Manipulating their data to meet strict technical de-
identification standards, the researchers faced fundamental 
tradeoffs between privacy on the one hand, and “[their] respon-
sibility to release data for replication and downstream anal-
yses, on the other.  For example, the original analysis found 
that approximately five percent of course registrants earned 
certificates.  Some methods of de-identification cut that per-
centage in half.”103  The researchers concluded that: 
It is possible to quantify the difference between replications 
from the de-identified data and original findings; however, 
it is difficult to fully anticipate whether findings from novel 
                                                          
 98.  John Daries et al., Privacy, Anonymity, and Big Data in the Social Sci-
ences: Quality Social Science Research and the Privacy of Human Subjects Re-
quires Trust, 12 QUEUE 7 (2014), https://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=2661641. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  34 CFR §99.30. 
 101.  Latanya Sweeney, K-Anonymity: A Model For Protecting Privacy, 10 (5) 
INT’L J. UNCERTAINTY, 
FUZZINESS & KNOWLEDGE-BASED SYSTEMS 557 (2002). 
 102.  Khaled El Emam & Fida Kamal Dankar, Protecting Privacy Using k-An-
onymity, 15(5) J. Am. Med. Inform. Assoc. 637 (2008). 
 103.  Id. 
03 TENE FINAL 5/18/2016  4:29 PM 
2016] SHADES OF GRAY 625 
analyses will result in valid insights or artifacts of de-iden-
tification. Higher standards for de-identification can lead to 
lower-value de-identified data. This could have a chilling 
effect on the motivations of social science researchers. If 
findings are likely to be biased by the de-identification pro-
cess, why should researchers spend their scarce time on de-
identified data?104 
B. Geolocation and Traffic Services 
Traffic applications are a type of location-based service 
that compiles geolocation data to provide mobile device users 
with real-time information about their surroundings. This data 
can be used in an aggregate form to study traffic flows, improve 
urban planning, and reduce traffic congestion. Typically, when 
location data collected from a user’s mobile device is sent to a 
phone carrier, operating system or location service provider, 
any unique identifiers are hashed. The hashed traffic data are 
then placed into a data vault and enriched with additional lo-
cation data, before being returned to the user’s mobile devices 
so that the user can, for example, see traffic conditions ahead 
or recalculate his commute to avoid congestion. 
In order to provide a user with relevant, real-time traffic 
information, location services must track the user’s geolocation 
at particular points in time, and must be able to link traffic 
reports back to that specific user. At the same time, combina-
tions of technical, administrative, and legal controls can offer 
protections to users’ sensitive location data. These include 
hashing individual identifiers, aggregating data after a set pe-
riod of time, and applying contractual use restrictions. For ex-
ample, before an app shares hashed traffic data with third par-
ties for research or marketing purposes, the data recipients’ 
data practices are reviewed and data are typically further ag-
gregated into traffic reports. 
C. Payment Processing 
Payment processing companies aggregate billions of pay-
ment card transactions to provide value to both merchants and 
consumers. For example, the information can be used to detect 
theft and prevent fraud or to improve operational efficiencies. 
In some cases, payment data must remain quickly linkable to 
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an individual so that the services can readily confirm the pur-
chaser’s identity, for example, at a gas pump. Companies cur-
rently rely on practical de-identification and aggregation tech-
niques to protect individual privacy as merchants, banks, and 
payment processing companies handle transaction infor-
mation. 
In order to maintain unique payment records without 
identifying users, payment processing companies remove all 
personally identifiable information from the transaction data 
and subject the account numbers to a one-way hash. Any non-
transaction data, such as information from a loyalty rewards 
program, is aggregated and reviewed before being combined 
with de-identified transaction data. Information from these 
sources is placed into separate data warehouses, and can be 
aggregated into larger and larger datasets depending on the 
sensitivity of the transaction data. A data analytics team can 
then access outputs from the data warehouse, for example, to 
detect fraud. Aggregated reports can also be provided to mer-
chants and banks, and can be combined with other macroeco-
nomic data to gain further insights. 
D. Medical Devices 
Medical device manufacturers require potentially identifi-
able data for a range of critical purposes, including: monitoring 
device performance, conducting safety-related analysis, ad-
dressing customer escalations and concerns, and allowing ad-
vanced equipment troubleshooting. For example, when a pa-
tient complains about warming from a magnetic resonance 
(MRI) scan, data obtained from the relevant device is needed 
to understand and remediate this potentially hazardous situa-
tion. This, in turn, may require analyzing a wide range of data 
collected over time (including patient weight, the time and date 
of each relevant scan, the cumulative effect of multiple scans 
on the device, and the parameters used within each scan), so 
manufacturers must be able to link certain scan information to 
individual patients. 
Engineers from medical device manufacturers have deter-
mined that more privacy-protective approaches—such as ag-
gregating scans at the device level (as opposed to gathering 
scan-specific data), removing linkable patient information 
such as patient weight from the dataset, or replacing actual 
values with a range of values—are not feasible. Any of these 
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alternatives would increase machine downtime, adversely im-
pact hospitals’ efficiency in providing patient care, and impede 
device manufacturers’ patient-safety and troubleshooting in-
vestigations. For example, the date and time of an exam scan 
are needed to correlate a discrete error event with a specific 
exam. The precise weight of a patient is needed to approximate 
various aspects of the physics that occur during an MRI scan, 
including those that help ensure that the scanner is operating 
within safe margins (for example, the amount of radio fre-
quency power that may be needed to image a large adult would 
not be safe for a small child). In addition, a hashed patient ID 
is needed to group scans by patient to enable medical device 
manufactures understand whether a series of machine anom-
alies involved a single patient or different patients. A hashed 
patient ID is also needed to differentiate between actual exams 
and test exams, and to perform usage analyses. Using a range 
of values or aggregating patient IDs would disrupt a medical 
device manufacturer’s ability to perform these needed tasks. 
E. Genetic Research 
In genetic research, maintaining a capacity to identify in-
dividual-level data is critically important. It enables partici-
pants in studies to withdraw their consent and allows re-
searchers or clinicians to alert patients to incidental findings, 
as may be required by law or ethical codes of conduct. Given 
the sensitivity of individual medical and genetic data and the 
unsuitability of technically irreversible anonymization, robust 
de-identification techniques and strong administrative and le-
gal privacy and security controls must be deployed to protect 
individual privacy. 
The privacy certificate Schering AG received from the 
Schleswig-Holstein DPA in 2003 demonstrates how robust de-
identification measures can pass muster with a data protection 
regulator in the context of pharmacogenetic research. The re-
search-centered German pharmaceutical company collected 
blood and tissue samples “to determine the relationship be-
tween certain genetic information and the effect of pharmaceu-
tical products upon it” and then “subsequently compared with 
the medical data from the participants which has been ob-
tained in the context of clinical studies.”105 Because German 
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law required that participants in clinical trials have the right 
to withdraw consent and have their data verifiably deleted at 
any time, data could not be fully anonymized. Instead, recog-
nizing “the fact that with scientific evaluation, an identifica-
tion isn’t required and a matching of genetic and medical data 
is enough in each case,” the company developed a double-pseu-
donym process to protect the data from both external and in-
ternal attacks through role-based access permissions, firewall 
systems, encryption, and other controls. The certified program 
provided protection such that “Even in the case that genetic or 
clinical data fall into the hands of an unauthorized party, the 
activation of the matching procedure requires two separate 
and independent sites.” 
F. Mobile Devices 
Mobile devices provide powerful connectivity, computing 
power and utility. These devices use a complex interplay be-
tween hardware, firmware, operating system, applications, 
and wireless networks (including cellular, WiFi, Bluetooth, 
GPS, and others). Each element of the wireless ecosystem is 
often provided by a different company competing to provide the 
best possible consumer experience—better connectivity, en-
hanced reliability and security, faster speeds, more computing 
power, more capabilities and functionalities through sensors 
and other technologies, and longer battery life. By analyzing 
data about how mobile devices are used in real-world settings, 
these companies reduce dropped calls or poor connections, en-
hance security, mitigate conflicts and crashes in mobile oper-
ating systems and apps, and extend battery life.  Other identi-
fiers are used for advertising or analyzing app usage. 
In many cases, companies do not need to collect customer 
names, email or street addresses, phone numbers, or web 
browsing information—basic identifiers linked to the device 
and its usage provides a plethora of benefits. For example, a 
device identifier, such as a UDID or IMEI, software and firm-
ware versions, make, model, and operating system could help 
identify issues across classes of devices as well as issues with 
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particular device configurations. Information about the net-
work quality, cellular signal quality, and device location could 
be harnessed to improve network performance, while infor-
mation about the CPU/GPU/DSP and other hardware usage 
and heat the device is generating used to improve hardware 
and software configurations. Knowing information about 
nearby WiFi signals and other wireless networks also could 
help offload data from cellular networks, as well as improve 
the performance of location services. Similarly, information on 
a device’s configurations, hardware and software is key to re-
ducing conflicts and crashes. Simply knowing the number of 
devices with a particular software version could help under-
stand the risk for a known software flaw. Without this data, 
companies risk staying blind to the scope of a security problem. 
While some mobile or advertising identifiers may be 
widely shared and linked to explicit personal information, oth-
ers are subject to tight controls, easy for users to clear and re-
liably limited from being linked to other identifiers. Some iden-
tifiers are regularly rotated by the provider, limiting the ability 
of third parties to use them over time. 
 
